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Another Conservative Lie. Social Security Will Go Broke.

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

The simple fact is that Social Security won’t go broke.  So for those who may be frightened by all the talk of ‘fixing’ social security, here’s the truth.  From Bruce Webb over at the Angry Bear blog.  Of course Bruce has a big advantage over political conservatives.  He knows the math.

“A couple of further notes. If retirement benefits are projected to increase in real terms by close to 100% over the next 75 years, then a projected cut of 20-25% on Trust Fund exhaustion would STILL see those future workers with larger baskets of goods than similarly situated retirees (this is what we call ‘Rosser’s Equation’).

But this real term increase doesn’t come at the expense of younger workers still in the work force, at least not without some forced special pleading. The goal clearly shown in Fig 2 is to keep overall replacement values steady with each future generation just able to hold onto its share of the overall societal increase. This seems fair to me.

There are some that insist that if you ‘really’ look at the numbers you will see that Social Security was simply too generous to earlier generations. How you reconcile this with these graphs showing that each generation will be able to afford a bigger basket of goods than their predessessor would seem difficult. Because arguments from ROI (but I could have had EVEN MORE, and screw Grandma) seem pretty hard-hearted and selfish. But perhaps someone can make the moral case in comments.”

Beezer here.  So if even the math challenged can understand that Social Security isn’t going to go broke, what the heck is going on?  Webb has an idea.

“Nope in my opinion the fundamental motive for opposing Social Security is not driven by greed as such but instead an ideology that depends crucially on the perception that Big Government is always and everywhere a failure, and that the bigger the counter-example the higher the risk to that overall paradigm. If Social Security was just headed for the cliff, its enemies would just stand back and watch it go, arguably this is where they were at in 1993. It is only when they see the coach driver beginning to get the team under control and steer it away from the cliff that they have to jump in and try to spook the horses again.

Which is why people asking why the actions of Social Security opponents don’t seem to be particularly helpful in guiding the stage coach away from the cliff are asking the wrong question, looked at in that way their actions don’t make sense at all. On the other hand if you flip it around a lot of things become clear, there being more than one definition of ‘fixing’.”

Beezer again.  There it is, that damn ideology again.  No matter the evidence.  No matter the math.  No matter the real historical record.  Republicans have so bought into the myth that the government can do no good, only harm, that such a large success like Social Security cannot be let stand.  So spook the horses and drive the program off the cliff.  That’s the only ‘fix’ the Republicans have in mind.

Beware America.  You are being sold down the proverbial river of misplaced ideology.

Liberal Problem. Their Jaws Keep Dropping To The Ground.

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

And as a result, they are rendered speechless much of the time.

True story.  From a C-Span call in show during the health care reform debate.

The caller complained about ‘socialist’ medicine and all the perceived evils of socialism in general and socialism in medicine in particular.  The caller was asked how he got his medical treatment.  His answer?  The Veterans Administration, possible the most purely socialised medical system on the planet.

When asked why he didn’t avail himself of private insurance his answer was “I can’t afford it.”

Liberals listening to this exchange probably didn’t get their jaws off the ground for several minutes.  They were rendered speechless.  No wonder they often lose an argument:  They can’t talk!

And this from a post by economist Maxine Udall that appeared on economist’s view:

“…[T]he spectre of “socialized medicine” prevents us moving to single payer, where the incentives for prudent life cycle management of risk across all age and income groups would be better aligned. Why, when we already have what is in effect single payer for the elderly and the poor, do some believe that single payer is “socialized medicine” and why do they fear it so?

I gained some insight into this recently when an elderly relative started complaining about “Obamacare” and how it would lead to “socialized medicine.” Knowing the person had heart surgery courtesy of Medicare and was receiving ongoing monitoring and care, I said, “I didn’t realize you were so unhappy with Medicare.” To which I received the reply: “I’m not talking about Medicare, I’m talking about socialized medicine.”

“How is Medicare different from socialized medicine?” I asked.

“Medicare isn’t socialized,” came the reply. “I pay for it. I pay every month and when I’ve had surgery, I’ve had to pay some of it. Medicare is like any other insurance.”

“Well,” I said, “I know you’re paying a premium for Part B and I know there are copayments and deductibles, but Medicare is a government run health insurance program.”

To which the reply was: “But I’m talking about socialized medicine. You know that whenever the government gets involved in anything, it never does a good job.”

“I had no idea you were having problems with Medicare.” said I. “I always had the impression you were pretty satisfied with it. And with the VA, too. I know you’ve used the VA for some care recently. What problems have you had with Medicare or the VA?”

“Well, none with Medicare or the VA, but I’m not talking about Medicare. I’m talking about socialized medicine.”

“So you’re happy with Medicare?”

“Yes.”

“Would you mind if your [adult] children could buy into it? Your son is unemployed. Would it be OK if he could buy into Medicare?”

“Well, sure. As long as he has to pay like I do.”

You were all wondering how someone could say, “Keep your government hands off my Medicare?” Well, there you have it. Now that I’ve told you, I’m still not sure I understand it. It was one of the most frustrating and at the same time enlightening conversations I have had in a long time. The person with whom I was conversing is intelligent, educated, and not senile.

I’m just not sure how to use the above information. I was unable to persuade my elderly relative. I confess that since the conversation, I have despaired that the national conversation will ever be much better.”

Beezer.  And so it goes.  Our jaws are constantly resting on the floor from our astonishment.  Liberals need to get used to the American public’s propensity to stab itself repeatedly. 

Describing The Pervasive Fraud Of Our Banking System. Professor Galbraith.

Wednesday, July 21st, 2010

Professor James Galbraith, of the University of Texas, is a powerful speaker and writer/critic of recent economic thought.  Here is a devastating critique of what the financial sector actually did to the American taxpayer, made in a written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

“Chairman Specter, Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Subcommittee, as a former member of the congressional staff it is a pleasure to submit this statement for your record.

I write to you from a disgraced profession. Economic theory, as widely taught since the 1980s, failed miserably to understand the forces behind the financial crisis. Concepts including “rational expectations,” “market discipline,” and the “efficient markets hypothesis” led economists to argue that speculation would stabilize prices, that sellers would act to protect their reputations, that caveat emptor could be relied on, and that widespread fraud therefore could not occur. Not all economists believed this – but most did.

Thus the study of financial fraud received little attention. Practically no research institutes exist; collaboration between economists and criminologists is rare; in the leading departments there are few specialists and very few students. Economists have soft- pedaled the role of fraud in every crisis they examined, including the Savings & Loan debacle, the Russian transition, the Asian meltdown and the dot.com bubble. They continue to do so now. At a conference sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute in New York on April 17, the closest a former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Peter Fisher, got to this question was to use the word “naughtiness.” This was on the day that the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud.

There are exceptions. A famous 1993 article entitled “Looting: Bankruptcy for Profit,” by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, drew exceptionally on the experience of regulators who understood fraud. The criminologist-economist William K. Black of the University of Missouri-Kansas City is our leading systematic analyst of the relationship between financial crime and financial crisis. Black points out that accounting fraud is a sure thing when you can control the institution engaging in it: “the best way to rob a bank is to own one.” The experience of the Savings and Loan crisis was of businesses taken over for the explicit purpose of stripping them, of bleeding them dry. This was established in court: there were over one thousand felony convictions in the wake of that debacle. Other useful chronicles of modern financial fraud include James Stewart’s Den of Thieves on the Boesky-Milken era and Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools, on the Enron scandal. Yet a large gap between this history and formal analysis remains.

Formal analysis tells us that control frauds follow certain patterns. They grow rapidly, reporting high profitability, certified by top accounting firms. They pay exceedingly well. At the same time, they radically lower standards, building new businesses in markets previously considered too risky for honest business. In the financial sector, this takes the form of relaxed – no, gutted – underwriting, combined with the capacity to pass the bad penny to the greater fool. In California in the 1980s, Charles Keating realized that an S&L charter was a “license to steal.” In the 2000s, sub-prime mortgage origination was much the same thing. Given a license to steal, thieves get busy. And because their performance seems so good, they quickly come to dominate their markets; the bad players driving out the good.

The complexity of the mortgage finance sector before the crisis highlights another characteristic marker of fraud. In the system that developed, the original mortgage documents lay buried – where they remain – in the records of the loan originators, many of them since defunct or taken over. Those records, if examined, would reveal the extent of missing documentation, of abusive practices, and of fraud. So far, we have only very limited evidence on this, notably a 2007 Fitch Ratings study of a very small sample of highly-rated RMBS, which found “fraud, abuse or missing documentation in virtually every file.” An efforts a year ago by Representative Doggett to persuade Secretary Geithner to examine and report thoroughly on the extent of fraud in the underlying mortgage records received an epic run-around.

When sub-prime mortgages were bundled and securitized, the ratings agencies failed to examine the underlying loan quality. Instead they substituted statistical models, in order to generate ratings that would make the resulting RMBS acceptable to investors. When one assumes that prices will always rise, it follows that a loan secured by the asset can always be refinanced; therefore the actual condition of the borrower does not matter. That projection is, of course, only as good as the underlying assumption, but in this perversely-designed marketplace those who paid for ratings had no reason to care about the quality of assumptions. Meanwhile, mortgage originators now had a formula for extending loans to the worst borrowers they could find, secure that in this reverse Lake Wobegon no child would be deemed below average even though they all were. Credit quality collapsed because the system was designed for it to collapse.

A third element in the toxic brew was a simulacrum of “insurance,” provided by the market in credit default swaps. These are doomsday instruments in a precise sense: they generate cash-flow for the issuer until the credit event occurs. If the event is large enough, the issuer then fails, at which point the government faces blackmail: it must either step in or the system will collapse. CDS spread the consequences of a housing-price downturn through the entire financial sector, across the globe. They also provided the means to short the market in residential mortgage-backed securities, so that the largest players could turn tail and bet against the instruments they had previously been selling, just before the house of cards crashed.

Latter-day financial economics is blind to all of this. It necessarily treats stocks, bonds, options, derivatives and so forth as securities whose properties can be accepted largely at face value, and quantified in terms of return and risk. That quantification permits the calculation of price, using standard formulae. But everything in the formulae depends on the instruments being as they are represented to be. For if they are not, then what formula could possibly apply?

An older strand of institutional economics understood that a security is a contract in law. It can only be as good as the legal system that stands behind it. Some fraud is inevitable, but in a functioning system it must be rare. It must be considered – and rightly – a minor problem. If fraud – or even the perception of fraud – comes to dominate the system, then there is no foundation for a market in the securities. They become trash. And more deeply, so do the institutions responsible for creating, rating and selling them. Including, so long as it fails to respond with appropriate force, the legal system itself.

Control frauds always fail in the end. But the failure of the firm does not mean the fraud fails: the perpetrators often walk away rich. At some point, this requires subverting, suborning or defeating the law. This is where crime and politics intersect. At its heart, therefore, the financial crisis was a breakdown in the rule of law in America.

Ask yourselves: is it possible for mortgage originators, ratings agencies, underwriters, insurers and supervising agencies NOT to have known that the system of housing finance had become infested with fraud? Every statistical indicator of fraudulent practice – growth and profitability – suggests otherwise. Every examination of the record so far suggests otherwise. The very language in use: “liars’ loans,” “ninja loans,” “neutron loans,” and “toxic waste,” tells you that people knew. I have also heard the expression, “IBG,YBG;” the meaning of that bit of code was: “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.”

If doubt remains, investigation into the internal communications of the firms and agencies in question can clear it up. Emails are revealing. The government already possesses critical documentary trails — those of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. Those documents should be investigated, in full, by competent authority and also released, as appropriate, to the public. For instance, did AIG knowingly issue CDS against instruments that Goldman had designed on behalf of Mr. John Paulson to fail? If so, why? Or again: Did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appreciate the poor quality of the RMBS they were acquiring? Did they do so under pressure from Mr. Henry Paulson? If so, did Secretary Paulson know? And if he did, why did he act as he did? In a recent paper, Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson argue that the “Paulson Put” was intended to delay an inevitable crisis past the election. Does the internal record support this view?

Let us suppose that the investigation that you are about to begin confirms the existence of pervasive fraud, involving millions of mortgages, thousands of appraisers, underwriters, analysts, and the executives of the companies in which they worked, as well as public officials who assisted by turning a Nelson’s Eye. What is the appropriate response?

Some appear to believe that “confidence in the banks” can be rebuilt by a new round of good economic news, by rising stock prices, by the reassurances of high officials – and by not looking too closely at the underlying evidence of fraud, abuse, deception and deceit. As you pursue your investigations, you will undermine, and I believe you may destroy, that illusion.

But you have to act. The true alternative is a failure extending over time from the economic to the political system. Just as too few predicted the financial crisis, it may be that too few are today speaking frankly about where a failure to deal with the aftermath may lead.

In this situation, let me suggest, the country faces an existential threat. Either the legal system must do its work. Or the market system cannot be restored. There must be a thorough, transparent, effective, radical cleaning of the financial sector and also of those public officials who failed the public trust. The financiers must be made to feel, in their bones, the power of the law. And the public, which lives by the law, must see very clearly and unambiguously that is the case.”
 

More On The Rise Of The Aristocrats.

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

Former Labor Secretary under President Bill Clinton, Prof. Robert Reich, has written a strong and direct post about America’s underlying, foundational problem:  The growing disparity in incomes.

“We’re back to the same ominous trend as before the Great Recession: a larger and larger share of total income going to the very top while the vast middle class continues to lose ground.

And as long as this trend continues, we can’t get out of the shadow of the Great Recession. When most of the gains from economic growth go to a small sliver of Americans at the top, the rest don’t have enough purchasing power to buy what the economy is capable of producing.

America’s median wage, adjusted for inflation, has barely budged for decades. Between 2000 and 2007 it actually dropped. Under these circumstances the only way the middle class could boost its purchasing power was to borrow, as it did with gusto. As housing prices rose, Americans turned their homes into ATMs. But such borrowing has its limits. When the debt bubble finally burst, vast numbers of people couldn’t pay their bills, and banks couldn’t collect.

Each of America’s two biggest economic downturns over the last century has followed the same pattern. Consider: in 1928 the richest 1 percent of Americans received 23.9 percent of the nation’s total income. After that, the share going to the richest 1 percent steadily declined. New Deal reforms, followed by World War II, the GI Bill and the Great Society expanded the circle of prosperity. By the late 1970s the top 1 percent raked in only 8 to 9 percent of America’s total annual income. But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income reconcentrated at the top. By 2007 the richest 1 percent were back to where they were in 1928—with 23.5 percent of the total…..

“What we get from widening inequality is not only a more fragile economy but also an angrier politics. When virtually all the gains from growth go to a small minority at the top — and the broad middle class can no longer pretend it’s richer than it is by using homes as collateral for deepening indebtedness — the result is deep-seated anxiety and frustration. This is an open invitation to demagogues who misconnect the dots and direct the anger toward immigrants, the poor, foreign nations, big government, “socialists,” “intellectual elites,” or even big business and Wall Street. The major fault line in American politics is no longer between Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, but between the “establishment” and an increasingly mad-as-hell populace determined to “take back America” from it.”

The structural problem began in the late 1970s when a wave of new technologies (air cargo, container ships and terminals, satellite communications and, later, the Internet) radically reduced the costs of outsourcing jobs abroad. Other new technologies (automated machinery, computers and ever more sophisticated software applications) took over many other jobs (remember bank tellers? telephone operators? service station attendants?). By the ’80s, any job requiring that the same steps be performed repeatedly was disappearing—going over there or into software. Meanwhile, as the pay of most workers flattened or dropped, the pay of well-connected graduates of prestigious colleges and MBA programs—the so-called “talent” who reached the pinnacles of power in executive suites and on Wall Street—soared.

The puzzle is why so little was done to counteract these forces. Government could have given employees more bargaining power to get higher wages, especially in industries sheltered from global competition and requiring personal service: big-box retail stores, restaurants and hotel chains, and child- and eldercare, for instance. Safety nets could have been enlarged to compensate for increasing anxieties about job loss: unemployment insurance covering part-time work, wage insurance if pay drops, transition assistance to move to new jobs in new locations, insurance for communities that lose a major employer so they can lure other employers. With the gains from economic growth the nation could have provided Medicare for all, better schools, early childhood education, more affordable public universities, more extensive public transportation. And if more money was needed, taxes could have been raised on the rich.

Big, profitable companies could have been barred from laying off a large number of workers all at once, and could have been required to pay severance—say, a year of wages—to anyone they let go. Corporations whose research was subsidized by taxpayers could have been required to create jobs in the United States. The minimum wage could have been linked to inflation. And America’s trading partners could have been pushed to establish minimum wages pegged to half their countries’ median wages—thereby ensuring that all citizens shared in gains from trade and creating a new global middle class that would buy more of our exports.

But starting in the late 1970s, and with increasing fervor over the next three decades, government did just the opposite. It deregulated and privatized. It increased the cost of public higher education and cut public transportation. It shredded safety nets. It halved the top income tax rate from the range of 70–90 percent that prevailed during the 1950s and ’60s to 28–40 percent; it allowed many of the nation’s rich to treat their income as capital gains subject to no more than 15 percent tax and escape inheritance taxes altogether. At the same time, America boosted sales and payroll taxes, both of which have taken a bigger chunk out of the pay of the middle class and the poor than of the well-off.

Companies were allowed to slash jobs and wages, cut benefits and shift risks to employees (from you-can-count-on-it pensions to do-it-yourself 401(k)s, from good health coverage to soaring premiums and deductibles). They busted unions and threatened employees who tried to organize. The biggest companies went global with no more loyalty or connection to the United States than a GPS device. Washington deregulated Wall Street while insuring it against major losses, turning finance—which until recently had been the servant of American industry—into its master, demanding short-term profits over long-term growth and raking in an ever larger portion of the nation’s profits. And nothing was done to impede CEO salaries from skyrocketing to more than 300 times that of the typical worker (from thirty times during the Great Prosperity of the 1950s and ’60s), while the pay of financial executives and traders rose into the stratosphere.”

Reich blames both Republicans and Democrats.  When it comes to the disheartening spread in wealth towards the wealthy and away from the rest of the country, both parties turned a blind eye to the problem.

And he says a likely result will be angrier politics as the public, not being able to connect the dots accurately, will strike out at anyone in government.

 

Reich warns that the likely result will be unpleasant for everyone, including the wealthy.  Beezer agrees.  The political backlash will not benefit anyone, except briefly a few political opportunists. 

Who Says Liberals Have No Sense Of Humour?

Thursday, July 1st, 2010

Check out political cartoonist Barry Deutsch’s “the 24 types of libertarian.”

Wealthy Refuse To Help Pay Down Deficits.

Wednesday, June 16th, 2010

For the past 30 years, the wealthy have literally sucked up almost all of the increases in profits and income.  For the remaining population, income increases have been practically nil. Now the government sees it’s debt balloon because of the recession.  And much of this increase comes about because the taxpayer is now shouldering what used to be private debt, much of it from bank balance sheets.  Even this transfer most benefited the wealthy bank shareholders, bondholders and top executives.  They were the ones being bailed out.

But are the wealthy stepping up to increase their taxes to pay off this debt?  Nope.  Instead they are recommending that everyone else pay for it by taking cuts in Medicare, or education funding, or Social Security – spending which the wealthy don’t need because their retirement is securely funded, and they can pay for all the medical care or education they might need or desire.

The wealthy derive much of their income from capital gains, not wages.  Capital gains are taxed at 15%, less than half the top income tax rate of 39%.  But even when it comes to wage income, the current tax tables are very flat.  A household with income of $100,000 pays a slightly less percentage of their income in taxes than does a household with $10 million in wage income.

We should repeal the Bush tax cuts and restore at least a moderately progressive tax system.  All the Bush tax cuts achieved was larger government deficits and a larger percentage of wealth being transferred to the very top of the income/wage group.




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