Productivity Increased But Wages Didn’t For Most Workers. Why?
September 2nd, 2010A new briefing paper by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) documents that median incomes haven’t gone anywhere for quite some time. Yet productivity has steadily increased. Economic models say median incomes should increase along with productivity. But they didn’t.
“From 2002 until 2007, productivity increased 11%, but the hourly compensation of the typical high school and college graduate worker actually fell. In other words, the disconnect between pay and productivity in the years leading up to the current downturn encompassed a broad swath of the workforce, with neither the median high school graduate nor the median college graduate capturing the benefit of the economy’s productivity growth.”
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Beezer here. And keep in mind this chart ends in 2007. Since then the trend has escalated because productivity has gone up during this recession, even as median income drops further due to massive layoffs.
Current thinking about this phenomenon, this disconnect between median labor wages and productivity growth, has brought the Great Depression back into the spotlight because it was preceeded by the same phenomenon. Most modern economists, though not all, tend to blame poor monetary policy by the Federal Reserve as a major cause of the Great Depression. Because they didn’t understand the effects of deflation, they didn’t realize that even lower interest rates were, in fact, too high in real terms. Fortunately the Fed today has the benefit of studying the Great Depression, so they didn’t make that mistake.
But maybe that wasn’t the real problem. Maybe the real problem is somehow connected to this wage/productivity disconnect. Maybe it wasn’t just a coincidence. Maybe the disconnect was a major cause of the Great Depression. And if so, then it might also be a major cause of the current financial induced recession too.
Rutgers History PhD James Livingston may be on to something in this article published by the History News Network.
“Look first at the new trends of the 1920s. This was the first decade in which the new consumer durables—autos, radios, refrigerators, etc.—became the driving force of economic growth as such. This was the first decade in which a measurable decline of net investment coincided with spectacular increases in nonfarm labor productivity and industrial output (roughly 60% for both). This was the first decade in which a relative decline of trade unions gave capital the leverage it needed to enlarge its share of revenue and national income at the expense of labor.
These three trends were the key ingredients in a recipe for disaster. At the very moment that higher private-sector wages and thus increased consumer expenditures became the only available means to enforce the new pattern of economic growth, income shares shifted decisively away from wages, toward profits. At the very moment that net investment became unnecessary to enforce increased productivity and output, income shares shifted decisively away from wages, toward profits.
What could be done with the resulting surpluses piling up in corporate coffers? If you can increase labor productivity and industrial output without making net additions to the capital stock, what do you do with your rising profits? In other words, if you can’t invest those profits in goods production, where do you place them in the hope of a reasonable return?
The answer is simple—you place your growing surpluses in the most promising markets, in securities listed on the stock exchange, say, or in the Florida real estate boom, particularly in view of receding returns elsewhere. You also establish time deposits in commercial banks and start issuing paper in the call loan market that feeds speculative trading in securities.
At any rate that is what corporate CEOs outside the financial sector did between 1926 and 1929. They had no place else to put their increased profits—they could not, and they did not, invest these profits in expanded productive capacity, because merely maintaining and replacing the existing capital stock was enough to enlarge capacity, productivity, and output.
No wonder the stock market boomed, or rather no wonder a speculative bubble developed there. It was the single most important receptacle of the surplus capital generated by a decisive shift of income shares away from wages, toward profits—and that surplus enforced rising demand for new issues of securities even after 1926, when, according to Moody’s Investors Service, almost 80 percent of the proceeds from such IPOs were spent unproductively (that is, they were not used to invest in plant and equipment or to hire labor).
The stock market crashed in October 1929 because the non-financial firms abruptly pulled their $7 billion out of the call loan market. They had experienced the relative decline in demand for consumer durables, particularly autos, since 1926, and knew better than the banks that the outer limit of consumer demand had already been reached. Demand for stocks, whether new issues or old, disappeared accordingly, and the banks were left holding the proverbial bag—the bag full of “distressed assets” called securities listed on the stock exchange. That is why they failed so spectacularly in the early 1930s—again, not because of a “credit contraction” engineered by a clueless Fed, but because the assets they were banking on and loaning against were suddenly worthless.
The financial shock of the Crash froze credit, including the novel instrument of installment credit for consumers, and thus amplified the income effects of the shift to profits that dominated the 1920s. Consumer durables, the new driving force of economic growth as such, suffered most in the first four years after the Crash. By 1932, demand for and output of automobiles was half of the levels of 1929; industrial output and national income were similarly halved, while unemployment reached almost 20 percent.
And yet recovery was on the way, even though increased capital investment was not—even though by 1932 non-financial corporations could borrow from Herbert Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation at almost interest-free rates. By 1937, industrial output and national income had regained the levels of 1929, and the volume of new auto sales exceeded that of 1929. Meanwhile, however, net investment out of profits continued to decline, so that by 1939, the capital stock per worker was lower than in 1929.
How did this unprecedented recovery happen? In terms of classical, neoclassical, and supply-side theory, it couldn’t have happened—in these terms, investment out of profits must lead the way to growth by creating new jobs, thus increasing consumer expenditures and causing their feedback effects on profits and future investment. But as H. W. Arndt explained long ago, “Whereas in the past cyclical recoveries had generally been initiated by a rising demand for capital goods in response to renewed business confidence and new investment opportunities, and had only consequentially led to increased consumers’ income and demand for consumption goods, the recovery of 1933-7 seems to have been based and fed on rising demand for consumers’ goods.”
That rising demand was a result of net contributions to consumers’ expenditures out of federal deficits, and of new collective bargaining agreements, not the eradication of unemployment. In this sense, the shift of income shares away from profits, toward wages, which permitted recovery was determined by government spending and enforced by labor movements.
So the “underlying cause” of the Great Depression was a distribution of income that, on the one hand, choked off growth in consumer durables—the industries that were the new sources of economic growth as such—and that, on the other hand, produced the tidal wave of surplus capital which produced the stock market bubble of the late-1920s. By the same token, recovery from this economic disaster registered, and caused, a momentous structural change by making demand for consumer durables the leading edge of growth.”
Beezer again. Does this sound familiar? This income wage shift occurred prior to this meltdown too. And instead of pouring the additional profits into productive investment (at least domestically, there was investment into foreign production) the additional profits searched for somewher else to park. And what Wall Street provided was mortgage securities. The resultant flow of immense cash savings into the housing market was a major dynamic in play pumping up the housing bubble.
So how do you climb out of this hole? You reverse the income shift, for one thing. And you use government tax and other policies to make domestic capital investment more attractive than investing overseas. This should include tariffs if necessary in order to stop or reverse the income shift that’s already occurred. It’s not just about protecting existing jobs and creating new ones, it’s also about producing wage gains–that’s the income shift that needs to be reversed.



