Posts Tagged ‘James Galbraith’

Describing The Pervasive Fraud Of Our Banking System. Professor Galbraith.

Wednesday, July 21st, 2010

Professor James Galbraith, of the University of Texas, is a powerful speaker and writer/critic of recent economic thought.  Here is a devastating critique of what the financial sector actually did to the American taxpayer, made in a written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

“Chairman Specter, Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Subcommittee, as a former member of the congressional staff it is a pleasure to submit this statement for your record.

I write to you from a disgraced profession. Economic theory, as widely taught since the 1980s, failed miserably to understand the forces behind the financial crisis. Concepts including “rational expectations,” “market discipline,” and the “efficient markets hypothesis” led economists to argue that speculation would stabilize prices, that sellers would act to protect their reputations, that caveat emptor could be relied on, and that widespread fraud therefore could not occur. Not all economists believed this – but most did.

Thus the study of financial fraud received little attention. Practically no research institutes exist; collaboration between economists and criminologists is rare; in the leading departments there are few specialists and very few students. Economists have soft- pedaled the role of fraud in every crisis they examined, including the Savings & Loan debacle, the Russian transition, the Asian meltdown and the dot.com bubble. They continue to do so now. At a conference sponsored by the Levy Economics Institute in New York on April 17, the closest a former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Peter Fisher, got to this question was to use the word “naughtiness.” This was on the day that the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud.

There are exceptions. A famous 1993 article entitled “Looting: Bankruptcy for Profit,” by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, drew exceptionally on the experience of regulators who understood fraud. The criminologist-economist William K. Black of the University of Missouri-Kansas City is our leading systematic analyst of the relationship between financial crime and financial crisis. Black points out that accounting fraud is a sure thing when you can control the institution engaging in it: “the best way to rob a bank is to own one.” The experience of the Savings and Loan crisis was of businesses taken over for the explicit purpose of stripping them, of bleeding them dry. This was established in court: there were over one thousand felony convictions in the wake of that debacle. Other useful chronicles of modern financial fraud include James Stewart’s Den of Thieves on the Boesky-Milken era and Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools, on the Enron scandal. Yet a large gap between this history and formal analysis remains.

Formal analysis tells us that control frauds follow certain patterns. They grow rapidly, reporting high profitability, certified by top accounting firms. They pay exceedingly well. At the same time, they radically lower standards, building new businesses in markets previously considered too risky for honest business. In the financial sector, this takes the form of relaxed – no, gutted – underwriting, combined with the capacity to pass the bad penny to the greater fool. In California in the 1980s, Charles Keating realized that an S&L charter was a “license to steal.” In the 2000s, sub-prime mortgage origination was much the same thing. Given a license to steal, thieves get busy. And because their performance seems so good, they quickly come to dominate their markets; the bad players driving out the good.

The complexity of the mortgage finance sector before the crisis highlights another characteristic marker of fraud. In the system that developed, the original mortgage documents lay buried – where they remain – in the records of the loan originators, many of them since defunct or taken over. Those records, if examined, would reveal the extent of missing documentation, of abusive practices, and of fraud. So far, we have only very limited evidence on this, notably a 2007 Fitch Ratings study of a very small sample of highly-rated RMBS, which found “fraud, abuse or missing documentation in virtually every file.” An efforts a year ago by Representative Doggett to persuade Secretary Geithner to examine and report thoroughly on the extent of fraud in the underlying mortgage records received an epic run-around.

When sub-prime mortgages were bundled and securitized, the ratings agencies failed to examine the underlying loan quality. Instead they substituted statistical models, in order to generate ratings that would make the resulting RMBS acceptable to investors. When one assumes that prices will always rise, it follows that a loan secured by the asset can always be refinanced; therefore the actual condition of the borrower does not matter. That projection is, of course, only as good as the underlying assumption, but in this perversely-designed marketplace those who paid for ratings had no reason to care about the quality of assumptions. Meanwhile, mortgage originators now had a formula for extending loans to the worst borrowers they could find, secure that in this reverse Lake Wobegon no child would be deemed below average even though they all were. Credit quality collapsed because the system was designed for it to collapse.

A third element in the toxic brew was a simulacrum of “insurance,” provided by the market in credit default swaps. These are doomsday instruments in a precise sense: they generate cash-flow for the issuer until the credit event occurs. If the event is large enough, the issuer then fails, at which point the government faces blackmail: it must either step in or the system will collapse. CDS spread the consequences of a housing-price downturn through the entire financial sector, across the globe. They also provided the means to short the market in residential mortgage-backed securities, so that the largest players could turn tail and bet against the instruments they had previously been selling, just before the house of cards crashed.

Latter-day financial economics is blind to all of this. It necessarily treats stocks, bonds, options, derivatives and so forth as securities whose properties can be accepted largely at face value, and quantified in terms of return and risk. That quantification permits the calculation of price, using standard formulae. But everything in the formulae depends on the instruments being as they are represented to be. For if they are not, then what formula could possibly apply?

An older strand of institutional economics understood that a security is a contract in law. It can only be as good as the legal system that stands behind it. Some fraud is inevitable, but in a functioning system it must be rare. It must be considered – and rightly – a minor problem. If fraud – or even the perception of fraud – comes to dominate the system, then there is no foundation for a market in the securities. They become trash. And more deeply, so do the institutions responsible for creating, rating and selling them. Including, so long as it fails to respond with appropriate force, the legal system itself.

Control frauds always fail in the end. But the failure of the firm does not mean the fraud fails: the perpetrators often walk away rich. At some point, this requires subverting, suborning or defeating the law. This is where crime and politics intersect. At its heart, therefore, the financial crisis was a breakdown in the rule of law in America.

Ask yourselves: is it possible for mortgage originators, ratings agencies, underwriters, insurers and supervising agencies NOT to have known that the system of housing finance had become infested with fraud? Every statistical indicator of fraudulent practice – growth and profitability – suggests otherwise. Every examination of the record so far suggests otherwise. The very language in use: “liars’ loans,” “ninja loans,” “neutron loans,” and “toxic waste,” tells you that people knew. I have also heard the expression, “IBG,YBG;” the meaning of that bit of code was: “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.”

If doubt remains, investigation into the internal communications of the firms and agencies in question can clear it up. Emails are revealing. The government already possesses critical documentary trails — those of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. Those documents should be investigated, in full, by competent authority and also released, as appropriate, to the public. For instance, did AIG knowingly issue CDS against instruments that Goldman had designed on behalf of Mr. John Paulson to fail? If so, why? Or again: Did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appreciate the poor quality of the RMBS they were acquiring? Did they do so under pressure from Mr. Henry Paulson? If so, did Secretary Paulson know? And if he did, why did he act as he did? In a recent paper, Thomas Ferguson and Robert Johnson argue that the “Paulson Put” was intended to delay an inevitable crisis past the election. Does the internal record support this view?

Let us suppose that the investigation that you are about to begin confirms the existence of pervasive fraud, involving millions of mortgages, thousands of appraisers, underwriters, analysts, and the executives of the companies in which they worked, as well as public officials who assisted by turning a Nelson’s Eye. What is the appropriate response?

Some appear to believe that “confidence in the banks” can be rebuilt by a new round of good economic news, by rising stock prices, by the reassurances of high officials – and by not looking too closely at the underlying evidence of fraud, abuse, deception and deceit. As you pursue your investigations, you will undermine, and I believe you may destroy, that illusion.

But you have to act. The true alternative is a failure extending over time from the economic to the political system. Just as too few predicted the financial crisis, it may be that too few are today speaking frankly about where a failure to deal with the aftermath may lead.

In this situation, let me suggest, the country faces an existential threat. Either the legal system must do its work. Or the market system cannot be restored. There must be a thorough, transparent, effective, radical cleaning of the financial sector and also of those public officials who failed the public trust. The financiers must be made to feel, in their bones, the power of the law. And the public, which lives by the law, must see very clearly and unambiguously that is the case.”
 

The National Budget. Explanation Part Two.

Thursday, July 1st, 2010

Beezer has on several occasions made attempts at explaining our national budget.  The effort is made because if most citizens don’t understand this budget, then they won’t be able to figure out the right policies.

The following comes from economist James Galbraith, and is part of his testimony before President Obama’s commission on deficit reduction.  The entire testimony is instructive and an easy read.  One of Galbraith’s real strengths is his ability to clearly explain what most economist’s would stumble over in detail.

9. In Reality, the US Government Spends First & Borrows Later; Public Spending Creates a Demand for Treasuries in the Private Sector.

“As noted, the above argument is based on the common belief that the government must borrow in order to spend, and thus that the government faces “funding risks” in private markets. Such risks exist, of course, for private individuals, for companies, for state and local governments, and for national governments such as Greece that have ceded monetary sovereignty to a central bank. But the situation of the United States government is quite different.

The U.S. government spends (and the Federal Reserve lends) in a very simple way. It does so by writing checks — in fact simply by marking up numbers in a computer. Those numbers then appear in the bank accounts of the payees, who may be government employees, private contractors, or the recipients of federal transfer programs.

The effect of government check-writing is to create a deposit in the banking system. This is a “free reserve.” Banks of course prefer to earn interest on their reserves. Thus they demand a US Treasury bond, which pays more interest without incurring any form of credit or default risk. (This is like moving a deposit from a checking to a savings account.) The Treasury can meet that demand, or not, at its option — it can permit, or not permit, the stock of US Treasury bonds in circulation to increase.

So long as U.S. banks are required to accept U.S. government checks — which is to say so long as the Republic exists — then the government can and does spend without borrowing, if it chooses to do so. And if it chooses to issue Treasuries to meet the demand, it can do that as well. There is never a shortfall of demand for Treasury bonds; Treasury auctions do not fail.

In the real world, the government creates demand for bonds by spending above the level drained by taxation from the system. The extent to which those bonds are held locally, or abroad (another common source of worry) depends on the US current account deficit. This also has nothing to do with approval or disapproval by foreign bankers, central bankers, or their governments of American deficit policy. A foreign country cannot acquire a US Treasury bond unless someone outside the United States has acquired dollars to pay for them, which is generally done by running a trade surplus with the United States. And when foreigners do acquire those dollars, then like domestic banks they prefer to earn interest, which is why they buy Treasury bonds.

Insolvency, bankruptcy, or even higher real interest rates are not among the actual risks to this system. The actual risks in this system are (to a minor degree) inflation, and to a larger degree, depreciation of the dollar. However at the moment there is wide agreement that a lower dollar would be a good thing — against the Chinese RMB and now also the euro. So it is difficult to believe that the goal of deficit reduction per se serves any coherent, or presently desirable, economic objective.

We can conclude that there is actually no economic justification for the target of reducing the primary deficit to zero by 2015 or any other date. The right economic objectives are to meet real problems, not those conjured from thin air by economists. Bringing about a rapid end to unemployment, caring properly for an aging population, cleaning up the Gulf of Mexico, coping with our energy insecurity and with climate change are all far more important objectives than reducing a projection of future budget deficits.”

Beezer again.  That Galbraith feels the need to explain this basic bookeeping concept to the commission is truly frightening.  These folks are supposed to know all this already!  Whatever they come out with for recommendations would best be ignored.

Once again, thanks to economist’s view for highlighting Galbraith’s testimony.

Pierre Calame’s Framework For Redefining Economic Standards.

Thursday, August 27th, 2009

Pierre Calame, a researcher and urban planner who is now Secretary General for the Swiss Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer, has proposed an accounting framework that he suggests could lead to sustainable economic systems.  Calame made his proposals before a group of economists and bankers gathered in Paris earlier this year to discuss “Financial and Monetary Issues As the Crisis Unfolds.”

What Calame proposed is contained in a white paper of the meeting authored by American economist, James Galbraith. 

“Calame placed before the group a series of principals for an accounting framework that could lead to sustainable system.  These involved distinguishing between four basic classes of goods.

“Those ‘that are destroyed when shared’–the historical tragedy of the commons, and in our time, most pressingly, the planet itself.  This domain requires the imposition of common regulation, with the goal of preserving the balance between human activity and nature.”   Beezer here: Think the preservation of our global fisheries, which are undergoing sustained depletion due to lack of regulation.

“Those ‘that are divided, when shared, in fixed quantities’–the case of nonrenewable resources, for which use by some precludes the use by others.  These require an accounting framework based in part on principals of justice.  Purchasing power at a given moment is not adequate justification for the using up of resources that, when used, are gone for all time.”   Beezer here:  Think fossil fuels and nonrenewable commodities like copper or other minerals.

“Those ‘that are divided when shared, but reproducible.’   These, like common services and artistic endeavor, are mainly the product of of human energy and skill.  They are the proper domain of the market and of conventional national income accounting, whose purpose is to assure the full utilization of human resources.

“Those ‘that are multiplied when shared.’  These are primarily the fruits of new knowledge, whose production society should encourage (by maximum emphasis on education and research), and whose wide distribution per se serves public purpose and social welfare.

“The Calame framework clearly suggests that the world community should move toward a redefinition of economic accounting standards aimed at placing planetary sustainability on the highest accounting level.  Thus, an activity should be accounted positively if it reduces greenhouse emissions and not if otherwise.  This by itself would induce tax and regulatory revisions that could cause a major reevaluation of industrial activity–movements toward sustainable technologies and away from destructive ones.  Similarly, an international framework incorporating principals of distributive justice would tend to penalize the waste of nonrenewable resources, especially by richer countries, while rewarding a shift toward conservation and renewable energy.

“At the same time, to make life under a sustainable regime supportable, it is essential the human experience not be degraded–that, in fact, it should actually improve.  The key to this is to recognize that there is no operational limit on either the spread of knowledge or the use of human talent.  A critical function of government is to ensure that education, research, and scientific development reach their full potential, and also that the resulting human potential is fully employed.  Achieving the latter, in a sustainable way, in return requires dealing with the unsustainable ecological consequences of conventional growth, and with the destabilization that will occur if commodity markets are left to unregulated market forces…..

“Clearly, events that move all four classes in a favorable direction are unambiguously to be preferred.   Clearly, events that move all four in an unfavorable direction are unambiguously to be avoided.  All other events are ambiguous, and the task of policy design is to fire correctly on as many of the four cylinders–global public goods, nonrenewable resources, human resource use, and the production and sharing of knowledge goods–as possible.  The task of economic statistics then becomes to define measures in each of these areas that permits one to say, with some confidence, whether the movement is, or is not, in the correct direction….”

Beezer again.  This group fundamentally rejects using the current banking/financial intermediation system to effect the recommended changes.  They point out that the current system has fostered “manic and unstable overinvestment (in technology, in housing, and finally in oil) rapidly increasing economic inequality, and a complete lack of progress on the environmental front.”

“The correct approach to increase the level of economic activity and employment should instead consist of measures run through the public sector, the household sector, and the business sector…Banking and finance can play a role in the achievement of these objectives–but only if the regulation to which they are subject directs them toward the public purpose.”

Beezer here.  And here is the rub.  Banking is not going to willingly go back to the classic liberal roles.  The neoliberal elevation of market forces to a position of supra-national power makes any move by governments to rein them back in problematic to say the least.

“A central delimma of globalization is that finances escapes from national systems of regulation far more easily than any other activity.  It is in the nature of financial transactions that they can be relocated instantly, and often clandestinely, in order to avoid the scrutiny of regulators…..As matters stand, even where nominally operating as overseas branches banking institutions are effectively broken into subsidiaries, each operating under local rules, each accounting to the standards of the local authorities, and between them taking every advantage of every form of tax and regulatory arbitrage…Hopes for an effective international safety-and-soundness regime are frustrated by national political considerations.  Countries that provide tax and regulatory havens benefit at the expense of their neighbors.  Countries housing major financial markets refuse cooperation so as not to lose competitiveness with other contending centers.  The multinational banks form lobbies pressing for least-common-denominator regulation, and these are effective partly because they can dominate national political systems and partly because they can play one government off against another.” 

Beezer….Getting this kind of cooperation may not be as impossible as it may seem at first blush.  The global recession has reverberated across central bankers from all larger countries, be they democratic or not.  The issue of mineral and other resource depletion is a common concern.  Country leaders know, possibly much more than the public at large, that the current systems of resource utilization are unsustainable.  They know that if not changed, serious economic if not military clashes are likely.  These changes are not likely to arise from the ground up.  It will take a very fortunate arrival of leadership from across the globe to effect changes that all can accept.   

             




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